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Defendant/Appellee W. Charles Barney, ("Mr. Barney") pursuant
to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby
submits the following brief in response to Plaintiff/Appellant,
Jonathan Jones ("Mr. Jones").
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals under its
authority granted by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2 (h) .

This is an

appeal from a final Order granting Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was the doctrine of Assumption of risk properly applied

where Mr. Jones was a participant in an amateur sporting event, and
was injured in a foreseeable accident, contemplated by the rules of
the sport?
2.

Can Mr. Jones appeal on the issue of intentional conduct

when Mr. Jones's "Second Cause of Action for Intentional Conduct"
against Mr. Barney was dismissed voluntarily on Mr. Jones's own
motion prior to Summary Judgment?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case was brought as an action for negligent, reckless or
intentional conduct. Mr. Jones moved to dismiss his own claim for
intentional conduct on the 9th day of March, 1992. See Exhibit "A".
Mr. Barney filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on the 4th day of
June, 1992, after the claim of intentional conduct had been
1

withdrawn.

See Exhibit "B".

Therefore, only the negligence and

recklessness claims were considered on Summary

judgment.

On

appeal, this court need only consider whether the doctrine of
Assumption of Risk applies to negligent or reckless conduct, and
need

not

consider how

it might

apply to

intentional torts.

Further, this court need only consider the application of the
doctrine of assumption of risk to cases where the injured party is
a voluntary participant

in an activity,

such as an athletic

competition, which involves a known, obvious risk.
Course of Proceedings.
After discovery, Mr. Jones moved to dismiss his claim for
intentional conduct.

Then, Mr. Barney moved for summary judgment

of the remaining issues in the case.

No oral argument was heard,

because neither party requested an oral hearing.
Statement of Undisputed Facts.
1.

Mr. Jones was the first batter in an amateur L.D.S.

softball game.
2.

Mr. Jones hit a "grounder" towards the pitcher's mound.

3.

Mr. Barney expected the pitcher to field the ball, but

when the ball rolled between the pitcher's legs, he fielded it
barehanded, and threw it in the direction of first base, attempting
to get an "out."
4.

Mr. Barney was somewhere between first and second base,

and was struck in the head by the ball.

2

5.

Mr. Barney cannot confirm or deny the extent of Mr.

Jones's injuries, if any. However, since the decision of the trial
court rests not on a decision of no damages, but on a decision of
no liability, this is not material to this appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Mr. Barney was not negligent, because everything that occurred
can reasonably be expected when an actor voluntarily participates
in a softball game. Mr. Jones asserted in discovery that he is an
experienced softball player, and has participated

in numerous

games. Mr. Jones should not be able to recover for injuries
sustained within the normal course of the game.
The doctrine of assumption of risk is a shorthand way of
stating the doctrine of license, and of comparative negligence.
Participating in a competitive, athletic event contains within it
an implicit license to the types of conduct that are reasonably
foreseen by the sport. Therefore, while conduct within the safety
rules of the game, e.g., throwing the softball to first, cannot be
a tort, while conduct outside the rules, e.g., tackling someone to
prevent their taking a base, is not expected by the participants,
and should be actionable.

Here, Mr. Jones had to know that when

you are playing softball, it is possible to be struck by the ball.
His participation is an acknowledgement that he has assumed the
risk of contact with the ball.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I: MR, JONES'S CLAIM IS BARRED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
Mr, Jones, in his brief, fails to distinguish between the
concepts of assumption of risk and comparative negligence. Here,
in addition to any comparative negligence that may or may not have
been present on the part of the Mr. Jones, he knowingly and
voluntarily assumed the risks involved in the game of Softball.
These known risks include the risk of being struck by the ball in
the course of play.

Rather than simply referring to the possible

negligence of the Mr. Jones, the doctrine of assumption of risk is
related

to

the

consent

participates in a sport.

given

by

him

when

he

voluntarily

Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal App. 2d 532

(1966).
In the case of Ridge v. Kladnick, 713 P.2d 1131 (Wash. App.
1986), the court stated that " [assumption of the risk is not a
mere variant of comparative negligence in this case.

rather,

assumption of the risk involves a knowing encounter of a danger and
a subjective standard of conduct." 713 P.2d at 1132, citing Prosser
& W. Keaton, Torts § 68 at 485 (5th ed. 1984).
contrasted

The courts

this to comparative negligence, or "breach

objective reasonable standard of conduct."

of an

The court goes on to

note that "this primary type of assumption of risk should continue
to bar recovery even after the adoption of comparative negligence
or fault because assumption of risk in this form is, in reality,
4

the principle of no duty-hence no underlying cause of action." 713
P.2d at 1132-1133.
In Ridge, plaintiff was injured in the course of a game of
"Shoot the Duck/Wipe Out" at a local skating rink.

Plaintiff was

injured in the expected course of the game, and brought suit. The
court there held that assumption of the risk was a complete bar to
recovery, notwithstanding comparative negligence. Here, the facts
are substantially similar.

Mr. Jones was injured during the

expected course of a softball game.

Mr. Barney was acting in

accordance with the accepted procedures for playing softball.
Therefore, Mr. Jones' assumption of the specific risks involved in
playing softball should act as a complete bar to recovery
Mr. Jones has characterized the issues involved in assumption
of risk as fault, but the doctrine can apply where a claimant is
without fault.

It is simply a recognition that certain events are

not actionable, because the participants have either implicitly or
explicitly consented to them. Under Mr. Jones's interpretation of
Utah law, a quarterback in any neighborhood football or basketball
game

would

be

interpretation

able
is

to

sue

contrary

for

to

tackles

any

and

reasonable

fouls.
conception

This
of

voluntary sports. Admittedly, if Mr. Charles had thrown a softball
at Mr. Jones on the street without warning, there might be a cause
of action, there simply should not be one in this situation.
Actions that could be considered tortious normally have been
held not to be a tort in athletic contests.
5

Where a softball

player collided with a baseman, he was held not liable for the
baseman's injuries, because he did not act in an unexpected or
unsportsmanlike manner, that is his conduct was within the safety
rules of the sport.

Novak v. Lamar Ins. Co., 488 So. 2d. 139 (La

App. 2d Cir. 1986). Where a Softball player broke an opposing team
member's ankle in a "slide", again the player was not held liable
because his action was not prohibited by the rules, and therefore
such conduct was within the realm of activities contemplated by a
game of Softball. Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co. .

558 So.2d. 787 (La.

App. 5th Cir. 1990) . When a softball player was struck in the eye
by a softball thrown by a teammate during "warm-up" the court held
that the player had voluntarily consented by participating in the
injury-causing event, and the player therefore understood and
accepted the dangers of the sport, including any carelessness.
O'Neill v. Daniels, 522 N.E.2d. 1066 (N.Y. App., 4th Div. 1987).
Here,

Mr.

activities.

Jones

had

participated

in

numerous

sports

According to his testimony, Mr. Jones had played

softball for many years, since his teens, see Exhibit "C". He must
have realized the danger of sports injuries.

In volunteering to

participate, he assumed the risks associated with the game of
softball.

This consent is an element of participation in any

sporting event, notwithstanding any contributory negligence or lack
thereof on the part of the Mr. Jones.

The doctrine of assumption

of risk is not barred in this case by Utah's comparative negligence
statute.

This action should be dismissed because defendant did not
6

violate any safety rule of softball.

In one case in this area, the

court permitted suit against a competitor where the player causing
the injury violated a safety rule in a unsportsmanlike manner.
Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d. 258 (111 1975). There, a soccer
player injured a goalkeeper when he kicked the goalkeeper in the
head.

The player had entered the "penalty area,"

where any

contact with a goalkeeper in possession of the ball is a violation
of the game rules.

In contrast, Mr. Barney was not in violation of

the rules of softball when this incident occurred.

He was not

attempting to gain an unsportsmanlike advantage, but was attempting
to throw the ball to his teammate.

This action should be barred

because Mr. Barney was acting in accord with the rules of softball.
Participants in sports or amusements are taken to assume known
risks of injury, though they are not deemed to have consented to
unsportsmanlike rule violations.

Ridge v. Kladnick, 713 P.2d 1131

at 1133 (Wash App. 1986) ; Robilard v. P & R Racetracks, Inc.. 405
So.2d

1203

vehicle);

(La.App. 1981)

(stock car race driver hit disabled

Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 92 111.App.3d 193, 47

111. Dec. 786, 415 N.E.2d. 1099 (1980) (Spectator injured at golf
tournament);

Daniel v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So.2d 118

(La.App.2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff injured while horseback riding);
Richmond v. Employers1 Fire Ins. Co.. 298 So.2d 118 (La.App 1st
Cir. 1974) (flying baseball bat); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448,
147 N.W.2d 587 (1966) (skating injury);
Vt. 122, 52 A.2d 788

(1947).

Duskiewicz v. Carter. 115

By participating in the softball
7

game, Mr. Jones agreed to accept the risks inherent in the game
that were obvious and necessary.
being hit with the Softball.

One of those risks was that of

Because Mr. Jones placed himself in

this are of known risk, Mr. Barney does not owe a duty to him with
regard to those risks.

Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc..

119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977).

It is inconceivable that Mr.

Jones could withhold his consent to participate, while still
participating, his playing softball evidences his intent to expose
himself to these activities.
Contrary to the interpretation given by Mr. Jones, this rule
is not a bright-line test for dismissal or retention of a claim.
The safety rules of a sport give an easily interpreted guide to the
courts for determination of what types of conduct the participants
have consented to.
football,

one

Therefore, in playing basketball, baseball or

consents

to

the

types

of

activities

normally

associated with these sports, as set out in their accepted rules.
To claim otherwise would be to advance the position that although
you were voluntarily playing softball, you did not realize that
there would be softballs being thrown from one player to the other;
or that although you had joined a basketball league, you did not
expect other players to attempt to block your goals.
a reasonable interpretation of sports participation.

8

This is not

POINT II: MR JONES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF INTENTIONAL CONDUCT
AFTER MOVING TO DISMISS HIS CLAIM,
Mr. Jones states in his Brief that the issue of whether Mr.
Barney

was

acting deliberately, willfully

or with

a

reckless

disregard for the safety of Mr. Jones should be given to a trier of
fact.

However, on March 9th, 1992, Mr. Jones filed a motion to

voluntarily dismiss his claim that Mr. Barney was acting with
intent to injure.

See Exhibit "A" Mr. Jones should not be able to

appeal the dismissal of a claim dismissed on his motion.
there

is

no

reasonable

reading

of

the

facts

that

Further,
show

even

negligence, let alone a reckless disregard of Mr. Jones's safety.
Mr. Jones stated in his deposition that he had no reason to believe
that Mr. Barney was acting with intent to injure, see Exhibit "C".
Therefore,

Mr.

Jones

cannot

appeal

on

the

grounds

that

the

intentional conduct claim should be decided by a jury.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly granted the motion for Summary
Judgment. Mr. Jones cannot appeal on the grounds that his claim of
intentional conduct should have been heard by a jury, when he
voluntarily moved to dismiss his own claim.
be upheld, and this Appeal should be denied.

9

The dismissal should

DATED THIS o W

day of May, 1993,

az~s

J. KENT HOLLAND
Attorney for Appellee.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee W. Charles Barney were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Leonard McGee, GOICOCHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY,
Attorneys for Appellant, The Harmon Building, 3540 South 4000 West,
Suite 100, West Valley City, Utah 84120, this

fyd

day of May,

1993.

r?. rhx&fnta*
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E X H I B I T

"A"

DEFENDANT' MOTION TO DISMISS

EXHIBIT #

A

LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
The Harmon Building
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100
West Valley City, Utah 84120
(801)964-8228
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JONATHAN JONES,
Plaintiff,
vs.

::
:
:
:

W. CHARLES BARNEY,
Defendant.

MOTION TO DISMISS

:
:
:

Case No. 91-0904369 PI
Judge Homer Wilkinson

COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter and hereby
moves the Court for an order dismissing, with prejudice, his Second
Cause of Action for Intentional Conduct against the defendant, with all
other causes of action remaining against the defendant.
DATED this

day of "^.^A,,, , 4

, 1992.

GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY

LEONARD E. McGEE

1

ORDFR
COMES NOW the Court and, based upon the motion of the Plaintiff
and with good cause appearing therefore, and having been fully advised
in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the plaintiffs
Second Cause of Action for Intentional Conduct is dismissed with
prejudice, with all other causes of action remaining against the
defendant.
DATED this

day of

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

HOMER WILKINSON
Third District Court Judge

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO DISMISS HIS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
and ORDER were mailed, vis First Class U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to
the following this

/

day of March, 1992:

J. Kent Holland
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Attorneys for the Defendant
623 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Daniel V. Goodsell
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN
Personal Attorney for the Defendant
60 East South Temple, #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

1

•

/

E X H I B I T

"B"

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EXHIBIT #
J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Attorney for Defendant
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
Telephone: (801) 363-9345
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JONATHAN JONES,
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 910904369 PI

W. CHARLES BARNEY,

Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendant.

Defendant, by and through his attorney J. Kent Holland,
and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
hereby moves that Plaintiff's claim be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED THIS

£ /A

day of June, 1992

VL-£?
vent Holland
torney for Defendant

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment was mailed,

postage prepaid, to Leonard E. McGee, GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST
VALLEY, Attorney for Plaintiff, 3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100
West Valley City, Utah 84120, and to Daniel V. Goodsell, Personal
Attorney for the Defendant, 18 00 Eagle Gate Tower, 6(
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

r'&

Y

tst South

da^/of June, J^992.
£2S~

J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Attorney for Defendant
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
Telephone: (801) 363-9345
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JONATHAN JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
W. CHARLES BARNEY,
Defendant.

]
|
|
|
]

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

i

Civil No. 910904369 PI

]i

Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendant, by and through his attorney of record, J. Kent
Holland, and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, hereby submits the following memorandum of points and
authorities in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment filed in
conjunction herewith:
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS:
1.

Plaintiff was the first batter in an amateur L.D.S. Ward

Softball game on or about July 11, 1990.
2.

Plaintiff hit the ball into the infield.

3.

Defendant was playing the second base position, and

fielded the ball.
4.

Defendant threw tne ball in the direction of first base.

5.

The player at first base did not catch the ball.

6.

The ball struck the plaintiff as he was running near

first base.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY
THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
As
Plaintiff

a

participant

is barred

from

in

a

team

recovering

athletic

for

competition,

injuries which

foreseeable and incidental to the competition.

are

77 ALR 3d. 1300.

The assumption of risk doctrine has been recognized in Utah.
Harrop v. Beckman, 387 P.2d 554 (Utah 1963), Mikkelsen v. Haslam,
764 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1988).

The doctrine of assumption of risk has

been distinguished from contributory, or comparative negligence, in
that contributory negligence is a failure to foresee a reasonable
danger, and assumption of risk involves the plaintiff knowingly
exposing himself to a danger. Moore v. Burton, 631 P.2d 865 (Utah
1981) Plaintiff's injury was caused by his being struck by the
softball in the course of normal play.

Since the danger of being

struck by the ball is an obviously foreseeable element of the game
of softball, Plaintiff can not recover.

The Plaintiff in this

action knew the risk of being hit by the ball during the course of
play.

In the absence of either an "unsportsmanlike violation" of

the established safety rules of the sport or intent to harm the
other participant, courts have not held athletic participants
liable for injuries. Bouraue v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d. 40 (La App.
1976) cert den. 334 So. 2d. 210 (La. 1976) , Naboznv v. Bamhill,
334 N.E.2d. 258 (111. App. 1975). Here, Defendant has not violated
any safety rule, nor did he intend to injure Plaintiff.

Plaintiff

cannot recover against Defendant on the basis of an athletic
injury.
In Utah, the courts have held that a participant in a
sport voluntarily assumes the risks of a sport of which the
participant has knowledge.
(Utah 1988).

Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d. 1384

In the case of OfNeil v. Daniels, 523 N.Y.S.2d. 264

(1987, 4th Dept) app den. 522 N.E.2d. 768, a New York court held
that a plaintiff could not maintain an action for an injury to his
eye

by

a

Softball

during

!,

warm-up"activities,

because

the

plaintiff, as a player, understood and accepted the dangers of the
sport. In Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co.,131 So. 2d. 831
(La.App. 1961) , a baseball player struck in the head by a bat that
slipped out of the hands of another player was denied recovery
because the

player was shown to be aware of the danger of flying

balls and bats. Softball and baseball players, struck by other
players, have been denied recovery because the danger of collision
is a recognized risk of the sport.

Tavernier v. Maes. 242 Cal.

App. 2d 532 (1966).
In this case, Plaintiff was a voluntary participant in a
game of softball.

The danger of being hit by the ball during the

course of play is a recognized risk of the sport.

Provisions are

made in the rules of slow pitch softball. Plaintiff either knew or
should have known the danger of being hit by the ball.
Point II:
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BECAUSE
DEFENDANT INTENDED NO INJURY.
This action should be dismissed because the injury was

not inflicted intentionally.
inflicted
maintained

in

the

course

Some courts have held that an injury

of

an

athletic

competition

can

be

if a participant intentionally injures an opponent.

Bouroue v. Duplechin. 331 So. 2d. 40 (La App. 1976) , Griggs v.
Clauson, 128 N.E.2d. 363 (111 1955).

In Bourque, a baserunner in

a softball game was held liable for deliberately running into a
baseman, where the runner hit the baseman under the chin attempting
to block his view of first base and stop a double play.

In Griggs,

a basketball player struck an opponent in the face with his fist in
an attempt to gain possession of the ball.

Here, Defendant did not

attempt to injure his opponent but is only alleged to have been
negligent.

Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he did not

believe the injury was intentional.
actual throwing of the ball.

Plaintiff did not observe the

Defendant was attempting to complete

a legal play, as opposed to the cases where liability was allowed.
In these cases, liability was allowed because the offending player
assaulted a competitor in an intention manner.

The defendants in

these cases were behaving outside of the rules of the sports and
were attempting to disable their competitors, not complete legal
plays.
POINT III:
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BECAUSE
DEFENDANT DID NOT VIOLATE ANY SAFETY RULE.
This action should be dismissed because the defendant did
not violate any safety rule of softball.

In one case in this area,

the court permitted suit against a competitor where the player
causing the injury violated a safety rule in a unsportsmanlike

manner.

Naboznv v. Barnhill. 334 N.E.2d. 258 (111 1975). There, a

soccer player injured a goalkeeper when he kicked the goalkeeper in
the head.

The player had entered the "penalty area,"

where any

contact with a goalkeeper in possession of the ball is a violation
of the game rules.

In contrast, Defendant was not in violation of

the rules of Softball when this incident occurred.

He was not

attempting to gain an unsportsmanlike advantage, but was attempting
to throw the ball to his teammate.

This action should be barred

because Defendant was acting in accord with the rules of softball.
CONCLUSION
This

suit

should

be dismissed

assumed the risk of this injury.
during

the

course

because

the

Plaintiff

The risk of being hit by the ball

of the game was

foreseeable, known

to

the

players, and part of the course of play.

The Defendant did not act

with an intent to injure the plaintiff.

The injury was not caused

by a violation any of the rules of the sport.
be

held

liable

for

this

injury

because

The Defendant cannot
of

the

doctrine

assumption of risk.

DATED THIS 4th day of June, 1992.

J. KENT HOLLAND
Attorney for Defendant

of

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to Leonard E.
McGee, GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY, Attorney for Plaintiff,
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 West Valley City, Utah 84120, and
to Daniel V. Goodsell, Personal Attorney for the Defendant, 1800
Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City,_Utah 84111,
this

*/

day of June, 1992.
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E X H I B I T

"C"

SELECTED DEPOSITION TESTIMONY

11
(By

1

Mr.

Community

College?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

Were you involved

4

C

EXHIBIT #

Holland)

in any sports

in high

school at Tyler?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

What did you do there?

7

A.

I ran track.

8

basketball.

9

Q.

And did you letter in those

10

A.

I did, y e s .

11

Q.

Any other sports after high

12

A.

Yes.

I played

football

and

sports?

school?

I was trying out for the Salt

Lake

13

Community College basketball team and I did play

14

several county rec leagues.

15

Q.

16

Basketball?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Did you play any county rec

19

What kind of county rec

in

leagues?

softball

leagues?

20

A.

N o , not softball.

21

Q.

How long have you played church

22

A.

Since I was a Deacon.

23

Q.

You are dealing with a gentile h e r e , so

24
25

Just church

softball.
softball?

Twelve years

you are not going to -- you have to give me
A.

That!s

fine.

Rockie

Dustin

* Capitol

Reporters

old.

ages.

12
(By Mr. Holland)
1
2

Q.

And did you play continuously

during

that

period of time?

3

A.

I did, yes.

4

Q.

Did you ever suffer any injuries of any

5

kind during your athletics prior to the

6

here of July of

f

incident

90?

7

A.

I did.

8

Q.

What type of injuries did you

9

A.

Senior year in football, I had a broken

10

collar bone.

sustain?

11 I

Q.

Any

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Did you play base ball in high s c h o o l , I

14

believe you

others?

said?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

You did not play base

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Did you play little

19

A.

I —

20

Q.

Did you play Pony L e a g u e , or Babe Ruth, or

21

any of

22

league?

yes.

those?

A.

Where I w e n t , it was Pee-Wee L e a g u e , Minor

23

League, and Major League.

24

major

25

ball?

And I played through

the

leagues.
Q.

How old does major league go up t o , 14?

Rockie Dustin * Capitol

Reporters

13
(By Mr.

Holland)

A.

1

I was 11 when I played.

2

from Pee-Wee to Major.

3

old.
Q.

4
5

I went

So my last year was 11 years

And during those periods of time, did you

ever get hit by the base

ball?

6

A.

Never.

7

Q.

The church al1-softball , is that

8

straight

all-softball?

9

A.

It's all-softball.

10

Q.

Is it all

11

A.

All

12

Q.

And were you ever hit with the ball at all

13

that you can

14

A.

Never.

15

Q.

You are lucky.

16

of t i m e s .
Q.

17

slow-pitch?

slow-pitch.

recall?

I have been hit a couple

I must be too slow to move out the way.
I'm

going to call your attention to the

18

day of this incident, which I believe

19

1990.

is July

Is that the correct date, as you recall

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

Do you remember what day of the week

23

A.

It was a Wednesday, I b e l i e v e .

24

Q.

Was

25

A.

A Wednesday

22

was?

it?
or Thursday.

Rockie Dustin

* Capitol

Reporters

11th,
it?

it

37
(By Mr. Holland)
1

Q.

What else?

2

A.

A moneymonger.

3

Q.

Did you ever say something to Charles

4

about whether he intentionally threw the ball or

5

not?

6

A.

Never•

7

Q.

You never said that you knew he did not

8

throw it intentionally at you?

9

A.

I do remember saying something like that.

10

Q.

Do you know that he threw it intentionally

11

at you?

12

A.

I don't think it was -- I don't know.

13

Q.

Has anyone ever told you that he

14

intentionally threw the ball at you?

15

A.

Nobody has ever said anything like that.

16

Q.

Are you aware, in your second cause of

17
18
19

action, that you claim that he threw it at you?
A.

I never claimed that he intentionally

threw the ball at me.

20

Q.

You've never read your complaint?

21

A.

Excuse me?

22

Q.

Did you ever read the complaint that your

23

lawyer filed on your behalf?

24

MR. McGEE:

25

THE WITNESS:

I think we sent it to you.
I don't recall.

I'm sorry.

Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters

